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Theme: The election of Nicolas Sarkozy as the new French President and the potential 
changes in the French security and defence policy. 
 
 
Summary: As the French prepare for the changes in domestic policy promised by Nicolas 
Sarkozy, France’s allies and the international strategic community are watching for any 
sign of a repositioning in defence and security matters. On the other side of the Atlantic, 
expectations are high, but Sarkozy might not be the Atlanticist that some people suppose. 
Most of the changes are likely to be more of style and personality rather than fundamental 
shifts in policy. During their first weeks in power, Sarkozy and his new government have 
focused mainly on European Union (EU) policy and the Middle East. France, for example, 
has remained surprisingly discreet on the issue of missile defence, perhaps a sign of a 
more business-like approach and of less grandstanding. One of Sarkozy’s priorities will be 
to reposition his country as a European player. His challenge will be to consolidate a more 
independent European defence effort, while not distancing France from the US and 
NATO. The new spirit of renovation might also emerge as a more pragmatic and flexible 
approach to strategic doctrine and the review of France’s White Book on Defence. 
Sarkozy’s emphasis on lifting France’s economic performance is also likely to be felt in 
defence planning and defence economics in general, with a strong support for the 
industry, as exemplified by the visit to EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and Space) 
facilities in Toulouse, his first trip inside France as new President. Sarkozy has been 
rather ambiguous on France’s role in stabilisation operations and peacekeeping, an 
elusiveness he will have to brush away very soon as pressure in Afghanistan is mounting. 
Finally, one of the new President’s most surprising proposals is to create a National 
Security Council on the US model, which will necessary shake up a long-standing French 






The Triangular Game: France-ESDP-NATO 
President Nicolas Sarkozy’s agenda is above all a domestic one and French defence 
policy is not expected to make any major departures under the new leadership. France 
will remain one of Europe’s strongest and most reliable defence contributors. Indeed, 
most changes are likely to be more of style and personalities rather than substance. Still, 
Sarkozy has made a number of proposals for France’s security policy. Most of them 
reflect a certain French consensus on defence matters, some are quite orthodox, but 
there are also innovative ones. 
 
In the evolving triangular game between France, NATO and the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP), some have seen in Sarkozy a shift towards a more balanced 
phase1 of French security policy that would confirm the ‘phenomenon of subtle 
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1 Some analysts have identified four consecutive phases in French strategic stance vis-à-vis NATO and 
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rapprochement between NATO and France, when circumstances and interests converge’. 
Sarkozy is generally seen as a pro-Atlanticist – ‘personne de sérieux ne soutient 
aujourd’hui que nous pourrions (…) nous passer de l’Alliance Atlantique’ [no one seriously 
sustains today that we could live without the Atlantic Alliance]– and has stated that the 
Alliance must remain the ‘cadre privilégié’ [the preferential framework] for Europe’s 
strategic partnership and dialogue with the US. However, Sarkozy plays with a typically 
French conceptual nuance of ‘Atlantic Alliance’, conceived as a bond beyond and above 
NATO and the EU. For Sarkozy, the consolidation of the European defence effort must 
remain the first priority, especially in a strategic context where ‘Europe is not anymore at 
the centre of US preoccupations’. Therefore, France must press harder for an 
‘autonomous European defence’. In this regard, under Sarkozy –as under his 
predecessors– Europe will very much continue to be seen as a power multiplier for 
France’s own security policy. 
 
One contribution of Sarkozy to the ESDP debate has been to put the emphasis on self-
sufficient territorial and population protection, mainly through political initiatives, like the 
Mediterranean Union, but also through European defence initiatives. An idea which if 
pursued would push ESDP beyond the actual focus on overseas crisis management, thus 
breaking the initial EU-NATO postulate of non-duplication. Still, unlike his very clear and 
concrete proposals for the EU, delivered in his major European policy speech in Brussels 
last September, Sarkozy’s plans for ESDP generally lack a strong institutional or political 
substance (except perhaps for the suggestion of a certain degree of reinforced 
cooperation that would have to include the UK anyway). They mainly revolve around the 
European defence industry: more pooling of equipment (mainly strategic air-lift), a 
concerted industrial approach, the development of a dynamic European defence industry 
base, open support to EADS, flagship projects (eg, space-based surveillance systems 
and early warning capabilities), etc. Sarkozy has also called for a rebalancing of European 
defence efforts –‘l’essentiel de l’effort ne peut reposer sur deux ou trois pays’ [the largest 
part of the effort cannot rest upon two or three countries]– and suggested the 
establishment of a European defence ‘convergence criterion’ to strengthen commitment 
towards the recommended defence spending goal of 2% of Gross Domestic Product. 
 
Sarkozy’s Prime Minister, François Fillon, is a defence specialist,2 who in early March 
identified five objectives for Europe’s defence policy: (1) to expand and coordinate 
intelligence resources, in particular regarding the fight against terrorism; (2) to improve the 
operational availability and responsiveness of forces; (3) to increase research and 
development; (4) to develop a European defence industry strategy; and (5) to build up a 
common position on missile defence. On this issue, Sarkozy has expressed his 
‘preoccupation’ with the lack of a ‘collective positioning of Europeans’, which he sees as a 
‘renunciation of any ambition of European defence policy’. Sarkozy and his entourage 
have not elaborated much on missile defence. In a recent interview, President Sarkozy 
made some veiled criticism of Russia’s attitude saying the US’s proposed third site is 
perhaps aggressive politically, but not militarily. He also lamented the lack of European 
accord on the issue. Overall, there seems to be a general consensus in France with the 
US perception of the threat and preoccupation about ballistic and nuclear proliferation. 
                                                                                                                                                   
European defence: (1) the promotion of an autonomous European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI); (2) 
the pursuit of ESDI within NATO structures; (3) the development of ESDP in the EU, while achieving a 
delicate state of balance and complementarity with NATO; and (4) priority support to ESDP with links to NATO 
for certain means and missions while transferring NATO’s acquis to the EU. 
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2 He started his political career in 1978, as chef adjoint du cabinet of Joël Le Theule, a Minister of Defence 
with Giscard. He was also a member of the cabinet of François Léotard in 1993. Between 1986 and 1988 he 
was the chairman of the Defence Commission at the Assemblée nationale and has been in charge of defence 
matters at the RPR (Rassemblement pour la République, Gaullist right). In the first Raffarin government in 
2002 he competed against Michèle Alliot-Marie for the defence portfolio, but had to give up as Michèle Alliot-
Marie had demanded a ‘ministère régalien’ and Chirac wanted ‘some sort of left-wing Gaullist’ for the sensitive 
Ministry of Social Affairs. 
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Notwithstanding a serious concern about a politically divisive –but crucial– security issue, 
France’s position on missile defence will likely be influenced by difficult choices about 
defence resources and priorities, the effectiveness of missile defence vs. traditional 
nuclear deterrence, and the promotion of French industrial interests. 
 
As regards NATO, Sarkozy has repeatedly stated that European defence and NATO are 
more complementary than replaceable (‘sont plus complémentaires que substituables’), 
so complementarity between both organisations would be the new maître mot, a new 
realism as opposed to the utopianism of previous years. On NATO’s evolution, Sarkozy 
said it had become an ‘efficient military organisation’, but one that lacks a project. He 
warned against NATO becoming a global organisation ‘on the fringes of military, 
humanitarian and police activities’. Repeating a traditional French mantra, for Sarkozy, 
NATO must remain a ‘defence organisation of a military nature’, centred on Europe’s 
security and which must not pretend to compete with the United Nations: ‘une 
organization de défense sans ancrage géopolitique n’a pas de sens, et n’a donc pas 
d’avenir’ and ‘l’OTAN ne doit pas se disperser et être dénaturée’ [a defence organisation 
without geopolitical anchorage has no sense and therefore has no future; NATO must not 
be dispersed and denatured]. Finally, building up on Berlin Plus, the EU must be able to 
continue to rely on NATO’s assets and capabilities, including planning and command and 
control. However, Sarkozy’s firm and probably insurmountable position on Turkey will 
certainly complicate this and will generally not facilitate a rapprochement between NATO 
and the EU and might complicate the cooperation between the two organisations on 
upcoming operational challenges in Kosovo or Afghanistan. 
 
In a speech at the Journée de la Défense of the UMP (Union pour un Mouvement 
Populaire, centre-right), on 7 March, Sarkozy said NATO’s military nature, European 
focus and support to ESDP were ‘the three conditions for the maintenance at its current 
level of the important contribution of our country to NATO’. More specifically, in what could 
be an attempt to positively revive Chirac’s failed 1997 proposal on the integrated 
command structure, Sarkozy has hinted at a possible review of the modalities of France’s 
participation in NATO, saying that France should adapt its rhetoric to reality if it really 
wants to influence NATO’s evolution. He also called for a ‘more autonomous role’ of 
European nations within NATO and for a certain degree of pre-coordination of positions 
among the main six EU defence contributors (UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and 
Poland) before deciding on joint initiatives with the US. 
 
White Book on Defence 
The fundamental orientations of France’s defence policy are based on the conclusions of 
the White Book on Defence, which dates back to 1994. Sarkozy has elaborated at some 
length on the need to review and update France’s defence objectives and priorities and 
called for a fundamental debate on the ‘re-evaluation of the strategic framework of 
defence policy’. This should follow a double perspective: an objective evaluation of the 
international and strategic environment, assessing the threats and challenges; and a more 
subjective review, based on ‘political voluntarism’, that should answer a number of 
questions about France’s priorities, its foreign policy goals, its level of ambition, what the 
country can realistically achieve on its own and ‘what it needs and wants to share with 
allies’, what operational engagements, and which hierarchy of military capabilities. 
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Sarkozy said this ‘re-evaluation exercise’ should start immediately after the presidential 
elections. He warned against long debates that would result in a rigid strategic doctrine. 
The strategic environment, he argued, is unstable and fluid and therefore requires a more 
regular adjustment of French strategic thinking. The preparation of a new White Book 
should be ‘de-dramatised’ and become a ‘more routine’ and operationally-oriented 
exercise. The new White Book should form the basis of the 2009-13 spending plan and 
lead to a review of France’s Armed Forces Model for 2015. Its main conclusions should 
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therefore be defined early and certainly by the beginning of 2008. One can speculate on a 
more pragmatic and flexible approach to France’s strategic doctrine. Interestingly enough, 
in this connection, François Fillon suggested the drafting of a ‘European White Book’ that 
should take into account EU enlargement issues, new threats and the ‘almost total 
disappearance of US troops from European soil’. 
 
Transformation, Defence Planning and Financing 
The current Loi de Programmation Militaire 2003-2008 (LPM), which was released in 
September 2002, already inspired a deep re-think of France’s overall defence effort. For 
the fourth year running, France has kept steadily to its ambitious defence spending and its 
transformation programme, reflecting the policy goals of acquiring a wider range of 
equipment and the modernisation of its nuclear deterrent. This will in principle keep 
France firmly on track to meet the objectives of the Armed Forces Model for 2015. A main 
task of the new defence team will be to begin work on the next five-year defence spending 
plan for 2009-13. The new LPM should continue to provide financial and political 
guarantees to further modernisation. Sarkozy has argued that, given the present security 
environment and likely military commitments, it would be unwise to reduce spending in the 
next LPM. He would see to it that the defence budget ‘is maintained at least at its current 
level’ –2% of GDP being ‘le seuil incompressible’ [bare minimum]–. Still, given that the 
2003-08 plan has so far been fully implemented, thus significantly boosting the budget, it 
seems unlikely that the government will be as generous over the next five years. In this 
regard, Sarkozy has vehemently insisted on the need to improve budget performance, 
increase efficiency margins and achieve better value for money, and promised that 
savings would be reinvested in the defence effort. 
 
For Sarkozy, the defence budget should not become an ‘adjustment variable’ for public 
finances. In contrast to Jospin’s ‘dilapidation’ years, he praised Michèle Alliot-Marie’s 
‘redressement salutaire’ [healthy recovery] after 2002, which will allow to build on solid 
ground. The economic efficiency of defence expenditure is an important issue for 
Sarkozy. For him defence costs are ‘productive spending’ in a sector that employs more 
than 180.000 workers in France and contributes substantially to research and 
development. Actually, most of his interventions on defence matters have focused on 
defence economics rather than on strategy or the security environment, in line with his 
national reform programme: ‘Le projet qui est le mien pour la Défense n’est donc pas 
dissociable du projet d’ensemble que je propose aux Français’ [My own project on 
defence cannot be dissociated from the general project I propose to the French people]. 
Sarkozy is generally considered to have more free-market impulses than his 
predecessors, so provided he fights back interventionist inclinations and jettisons the 
French protectionist model, he is likely to have a more liberal and pragmatic approach to 
defence economics. A sign of what might be coming are Sarkozy’s references to 
outsourcing a number of support functions ‘disconnected from operational activity’, to 
civilianise administrative positions and, more importantly, ‘to adopt innovative modes of 
financing’, such as private-public partnerships. Sarkozy’s stated intention to break the 
mould of some long-standing French defence sector traditions and his constant 
references to the UK model might augur new approaches to issues like outsourcing, 
financing and procurement. 
 
One of Sarkozy’s priorities will be to carry out a thorough review of current programmes 
before work on the next LPM begins later this year. He suggested a ‘hierarchy of priorities’ 
for flagship projects and said he will give special attention to programmes that reinforce 
France’s projection capabilities.3 However, it is commonly agreed that expenditure on a 
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3 Specifically mentioned were SCALP cruise missiles for the navy, new ‘Barracuda’ nuclear submarines, 
strategic air and sea transport and –breaking a long silence on the issue– the go-ahead for a second aircraft 
carrier, in order ‘to guarantee the permanent presence at sea of our carrier strike group, our operational 
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number of big-ticket items in the current medium-term defence blueprint will telescope in 
the coming years, which might push spending far above available allocations. France will 
have to stretch out some programmes and cut back others, particularly ambitious plans to 
boost the military space programme and remedy capability gaps in unmanned aerial 
vehicles and transport/refuelling aircraft. This upcoming budget crunch might influence 
programmatic decisions, as France might decide to cut back in some areas, or go for 
more multilateral solutions within NATO or the EU. A logical consequence of this would be 
more EU-NATO technical cooperation on capability development, but whether France will 
encourage that is another question. 
 
Expeditionary Operations 
Throughout the election campaign Sarkozy adopted a somewhat ambiguous stance 
towards expeditionary operations. On the one hand he argued that French forces must be 
carefully marshalled and not overextended and suggested a re-examination of the 
conditions for engaging troops abroad. Sarkozy said the French army ‘is not an 
expeditionary corps that is supposed to play the role of firemen and gendarmes in the four 
corners of the world’ and has called for a general debate that should contemplate issues 
such as the pre-deployment of troops, identifying priority areas for deployment, mandates, 
rules of engagement and financing. His contradictory statements on Afghanistan –
expressing ‘regret’ at Chirac’s removal of French special forces from the US-led Operation 
Enduring Freedom, but then hinting at a possible future withdrawal from NATO-led 
International Security Assistance Force–4 is an example of this calculated ambiguity. 
Despite this, and against the background of ISAF planning for troop rotations in 2008-09, 
it is likely that in the coming months France will initiate discussions with Washington to 
clarify strategies in Afghanistan. 
 
Sarkozy said he would accelerate efforts undertaken over the last 10 years to develop 
power projection and deep strike capabilities. His objective will be to finalise the evolution 
towards a ‘usable force’ capable of ensuring an appropriate forward defence. He 
acknowledged that in times of globalisation and proliferation, territorial security can be 
challenged outside French territory. Hence the need for forces able to quickly respond to 
threats far away from France. Sarkozy has put particular emphasis on the protection of 
troops in theatre, which should be ‘systematically reinforced’, especially in the case of 
ground forces deployed in hostile urban areas. He has gone into some detail on specific 
programmes: NRBC (nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical) protection, digitisation of 
the battlefield, individual equipments, vehicle armour, combat medicine, air mobility, etc. 
 
In what could be a sign of a re-evaluation of France’s military engagement in Africa, 
Sarkozy has linked the presence of the almost 4.000 French troops in the Ivory Coast to 
security requirements in view of upcoming elections in that country. He said he would not 
allow French troops to become ‘bogged down’ in such operations and stated that France 
has no vocation to sustain fragile regimes in its former colonies. 
 
‘Domaine Réservé’, Institutions and Civil Society 
In line with a growing European trend, but marking a clear break with French presidential 
prerogatives in defence matters (‘domaine réservé’), Sarkozy said he wanted ‘stronger 
involvement’ by Parliament in defence policy: ‘Dans une démocratie moderne, il ne saurait 
y avoir de domaines réservés, à plus forte raison quand les domaines réservés touchent à 
l’essentiel’ [In a modern democracy, there should be no private preserve, all the more 
reason because private preserves affect what is of the essence]. Devolved powers could 
relate to the control of intelligence services, the authorization of the ‘presence and 
                                                                                                                                                   
independence and our freedom of action’. 
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4 On 26 April, during a TV interview, Sarkozy said ‘la présence à long terme des troupes françaises’ [the long-
term presence of French troops] in Afghanistan was not ‘décisive’. 
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modalities of troop deployments abroad, after a certain time limit’, the approval of major 
arms programmes (based on Britain’s National Audit Office model), and the ratification of 
defence agreements. 
 
Despite all this –and the promised regular visit of the President to Parliament to present 
and explain his defence policy– it is unlikely that the head of state’s private preserve in 
defence matters will be fundamentally altered. One of Sarkozy’s proposals that will 
actually reinforce presidential powers is the setting up of a Conseil de sécurité nationale, 
a national security council, which should become ‘the central body for analysis, debate 
and thinking in security and defence matters, in normal circumstances and during crises’. 
Indeed, a ‘comprehensive approach to security challenges’ calls for a body that 
encompasses homeland security, foreign policy and civil and military defence. This new 
National Security Council will have different configurations depending on the issues and 
circumstances debated and will replace the existing Internal Security Council and Defence 
Council. It will also coordinate intelligence services, a function carried out until now by the 
Secrétariat Général de la Défense. Sarkozy’s stated intention is not to create a ‘chamber 
that would endorse the verdict reached by a restricted circle’, but rather a forum for 
contradictory debate among senior governmental experts to support the president’s 
decision-making. 
 
One interesting issue that has received little media attention, but that surfaced during the 
election campaign is the link between Armed Forces and society (‘Armées-Nation’), as a 
sign of an emerging debate, not only in France, but elsewhere in Europe, on the relation 
between the provision of security and its cost. It is about the perception of a growing gap 
between society and the men and women that act on its behalf in operational theatres. In 
France, this is partly the result of the professionalisation of the military, dubbed the 
‘second military revolution’ of the Fifth Republic (the first was the unification of the three 
services into a single Ministry of Defence in 1962). It also has a wider dimension that 
reflects a growing concern about the emergence of what Lindley-French has described as 
‘military ghettoes across the West full of soldiers and their families (…) detached from a 
society that understands little of what they do and cares even less’. In this regard, 
Sarkozy has stated that the integration of the military in French civil society is a major 
challenge –‘nous devons être attentifs à ce qu’ils ne décrochent pas du reste de la 
société’ [we must ensure that they are not left behind the rest of society]–. 
 
Conclusions: France has been in election mood for quite some time now. Following the 
legislative elections of 10 and 17 June, the dust should start settling and more signs of 
France’s viewpoint on a number of defence matters should become clearer. However, a 
big bang is unlikely. If anything, change will be an evolutionary process. The French 
strategic community has embarked on preparations for a new White Book on Defence to 
be finalised sometime before the end of 2007. As the basic strategic orientations of 
France’s defence policy are redefined, it is abundantly clear that Europe and ESDP will 
remain at the heart of France’s strategic thinking. France is indeed ‘back in Europe’ and 
that should also include ESDP. But the question is how much capital and effort will 
Sarkozy want to invest in strengthening ESDP and whether he will find the European 
partners to do so, starting with the UK. Following the 1997 US rebuff to France over its 
demands for a larger European role in the Alliance, Jacques Chirac championed an 
autonomous European defence and succeeded in convincing the British to support it, at a 
significant summit in Saint Malo in 1998. For Sarkozy, it will be a tough job to outdo his 
predecessor’s support for ESDP. One key issue will be his position on the development of 
a European operational planning capability independent from NATO. 
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One area where Sarkozy will certainly do better is relations with the US. In his victory 
speech Sarkozy appealed ‘to our American friends’ and said the US ‘can count on our 
friendship, which has been forged in the tragedies of history which we have faced 
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together’. How this new attitude will further materialise remains to be seen, especially as 
Europeans are increasingly looking towards 2009 and a new US administration. One 
possible early sign of this diplomatic thaw could be France’s rather conciliatory position on 
missile defence. Washington has great expectations and the centre of gravity in the 
transatlantic relationship has visibly moved closer to Paris. Still, the risk is that the US 
expects too much, too soon. Sarkozy has stated that ‘friends may think differently’ and his 
agenda is above all a domestic one, so significant defence policy choices might take 
some more time. One crucial decision will be Afghanistan, as the Alliance is facing major 
troop rotations in 2008-09. 
 
Sarkozy generally speaks his mind in a clear way and his proposed institutional changes 
in the defence policy area should also increase transparency and normalcy in the way 
decisions are taken and implemented. The enhanced role of the Assemblée Nationale in 
security matters was meant to introduce an element of checks and balances in what is a 
very presidential-centred political system. Now, this might be somewhat upset by the 
results of the legislative elections, which gave the ruling UMP an overpowering presence 
in parliament. As regards France’s ambivalent relationship with NATO, it would not be too 
far fetched to anticipate some changes that might improve the quality of France’s 
interaction with allies. France will likely want to exert more political influence in the 
Alliance and make its presence felt in a more creative and constructive manner. But that 
will not necessarily match the wishes of some of its Allies. There will be ample opportunity 
to test France’s willingness to change in the run up to the NATO summit in 2009 –marking 
the 60th anniversary of the Alliance–, which will take place after the US elections and is 
therefore already seen by many as a ‘healing summit’. The question is whether Sarkozy 
will finally overcome what François Heisbourg called the ‘strategic ambiguity’ by which 
France would be gaining time in NATO while the ESDP process gradually evolves through 
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